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This article examines how the EU’s ‘conflicted power’ in trade has played out within its preferential trade 
agreement (PTA) strategies with third parties. It does this by providing an overview of how approaches to the 
EU’s external trade policies have evolved over time, especially since the end of the Cold War. Tracing changes 
in discourse in the EU’s consolidated trade policy demonstrates how the policy objectives have evolved from 
what could be characterised as a soft and even normative power to a much more realist one, attempting to 
safeguard its position in the international economic order. Notwithstanding these changes, explained by a 
combination of international context and ideational preferences, an underlying overall continuity has remained 
in terms of the main economic interests to be realised through trade policy, which presents a portrait of the EU 
as a rational and realist (if sometimes conflicted) actor in the global economy. 
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Trade is one of the earliest “communitarised” policies of the European Union, where 
member states have delegated more sovereignty to the supranational level. 
Supranational prerogatives have increased as mixed competences have been delegated 
to the European Commission, resulting from the broadening of issues in international 
negotiations like the Singapore issues (competition policy, services, intellectual property 
and public procurement) which dominate the EU’s “deep trade” agenda (Young and 
Richardson 2006). As the EU’s first foreign policy area, and one in which the proverbial 
“single voice” (Meunier 2000) has largely materialised, it has become intertwined with 
other foreign policy aims (Smith 2001). Combining these with shifting preferences 
amongst member states (Baldwin 2006), the interests of economic sectors, the 
aggregation of interests at the domestic level and EU level, before defending its positions 
in the international arena, signify that the EU is truly a ‘conflicted trade power’ (Meunier 
and Nikolaidis 2006). 
This article examines how this conflicted power has played out within the area of 
preferential trade agreement (PTA) strategies. PTAs’ importance has increased in recent 
years, given the elusive denouement of the Doha Round at the WTO, and have become 
one of the EU’s trade policy main areas of activity. Moreover, they present ideal case 
studies to analyse shifts in EU trade rationales, as they remain one of the most 
comprehensive foreign policy tools of the EU, given requirements that they encompass 
“deep trade” as well as political cooperation, democracy and governance clauses. They 
are also the most sought after by third parties, as others hope to benefit economically 
from preferential access to the EU’s single market.  
Providing an overview of how approaches to the EU’s trade policies and PTAs have 
evolved over time, since the end of the Cold War; the narrative here addresses the 
question: how can we explain the motivations underlying EU choices in its trade policy? 
This is operationalised by tracing changes in discourse in the EU’s consolidated trade 
policy with regard to PTAs, through an analysis of EU documents, as well as Trade 
officials’ interviews, and triangulating this with developments in negotiations. These 
changes demonstrate how the policy objectives have evolved from what could be 
characterised as “soft” (Nye 1990) and even “normative power” (Manners 2002)-inspired 
motives (extending regional integration model, development), to more “realist” ones 
attempting to safeguard its businesses’ competitiveness and position in the international 
economic order. Notwithstanding these changes, explained by a combination of 
international context and ideational preferences, an underlying overall continuity has 
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remained in terms of the main economic interests to be realised through trade policy, 
which presents a portrait of the EU as a rational and realist (if sometimes “conflicted”) 
actor in the global economy.  
This portrayal offers novel nuances to the literature on EU’s trade policy. Within this 
literature the main debate has been between the collusive delegation camp, which claims 
the institutional arrangement grants the Commission independence (Nicolaïdis and 
Meunier 2002: 175; Meunier 2005: 8-9; Woolcock 2005: 247), and those arguing policy 
is determined by business lobbying for liberalisation (Van den Hoven 2002; Dür 2008; 
Coen and Grant 2005; De Bièvre and Dür 2005). Typically, trade policy has been 
characterised in theoretical terms by the principal-agent relationship between the states 
and European Commission (Dür and Elsig 2011; De Bièvre and Eckhardt 2011; Da 
Conceição-Heldt 2011), which has also been used to explain preferences for multilateral 
or bilateral regulatory venues (Elsig 2007). Alternatively, this article argues that those 
shifting preferences are mediated by the underlying tension between ideational and 
normative-inspired preferences and realist-material preferences, with the later taking 
precedence. In this way, the article further posits the applicability of realist based 
theories to explain EU trade policy.  
Traditionally, given realist theories emphasis on military power and security, they have 
been largely absent from the study of the EU. Recently they have been incorporated into 
EU scholarship, mostly in the area of foreign and security policy (Gegout 2005; Hyde-
Price 2006). With the exception of Zimmerman’s (2007) explanation of the EU’s positions 
on Chinese and Russian WTO accession based on realist considerations of power rather 
than domestic mobilisation of pro-liberalisation interests, realism has been absent from 
studies of EU trade policy. The following sections highlight the explanatory potential of 
realist-inspired approaches in understanding EU trade policy. First, the article presents a 
theoretical framework of what “idealist” and “realist” approaches to trade policy look like. 
Whilst subsequent sections apply these to the narratives of different periods of the EU’s 
PTA policy, characterised each by overlapping objectives: “global presence” (post-Cold 
War); “regional integration promotion” (mostly until 2006); “development and 
multilateralism” (1999-2005); “competitiveness” (2006 onwards). 
 
“IDEALIST” AND “REALIST” APPROACHES TO TRADE POLICY 
International Relations literature has been marked by debates pitting idealist aspirations 
against realpolitik; interest-based rational choice against ideas and value-inspired 
agency and constructivism (Snyder 2004; Thies 2002; Ashworth 2002). Realist and the 
more nuanced neorealist traditions view the international arena as an anarchic structure 
and self-help system where conflict arises from competition between states (Waltz 
1959). States are the principal actors setting the context (Waltz 1979), where their 
actions are determined by strategies seeking to guarantee the security and sovereignty 
of the state (Mearsheimer 2001). Realism assumes states are concerned with their 
power position vis-à-vis competing states (hence the importance of concepts like power 
balancing), and cooperate only if it furthers national interests and guarantees absolute 
or relative gains greater to those afforded to the other parties (Waltz 1979; Grieco 
1993). Although realists perceive states as unitary actors acting within a bounded 
rationality to increase their security, they accept these also act according to second-
order interests ranked below national security; which will be sidestepped, if they conflict 
with core security interests or balance of power logics (Mearsheimer 2001: 46). Realist 
assumptions have been linked to rationalist models of decision-making (Kahler 1998: 
924), where ‘foreign policy is explained by reference to the goal-seeking behavior’ of 
utility-maximising actors (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 54). Realism’s ‘theory of action is 
based on a self-interest which is defined in a predominantly materialist way in order to 
distinguish itself from idealism’ (Guzzini 2004: 536). Such individualistic rational choice 
is defined as: 
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‘The first element is the feasible set, i.e. of all the courses of action which are 
rationally believed to satisfy various logical, physical, and economic constraints. 
The second is (a set of rational beliefs about) the casual structure of the 
situation, which determines what course of action will lead to what outcomes. The 
third is a subjective ranking of the feasible alternatives, usually derived by from a 
ranking of the outcomes to which they (are expected to) lead. To act rationally, 
then, simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set’ 
(Elster 1986: 4). 
In a realist rationalist world, international actors are bound to look for power (Guzzini 
2004: 537). However, interests can, and are, defined in economic terms as well, more so 
in the current globalized world (Schweller 1999; Grieco 1990), where states compete for 
resources to enhance economic growth (Gilpin 1987), market shares and investment. As 
Robert Gilpin (2001: 21) argues:  
‘(I)n a highly integrated global economy, states continue to use their power and 
to implement policies to change economic forces favourable to their own national 
interests and the interests of their citizenry. These national economic interests 
include receipt of a favourable share of the gains from international economic 
activities and preservation of national autonomy.’ 
In trade policy, once the internal decision-making processes of bargaining and interest 
aggregation are completed, the EU acts as a unitary entity in international negotiations. 
This justifies an EU-level analysis, and facilitates the application of (neo)realist concepts. 
As the EU’s trade policy becomes increasingly concerned with economic competition and 
balancing against possible commercial advantages negotiated by other parties, 
realist/neorealist approaches, integrating commercial interests, can aid our 
understanding of events.  
A realist EU trade policy, in this sense, would be one where the EU seeks to maximise 
benefits for its economic actors: e.g. milieu-shaping rule adoption, gaining allies for 
multilateral talks, entering a market before competitors, and not just short-term 
increases in trade. Such a turn is salient since the explicitly competitiveness-driven 
‘Global Europe’ agenda (2006), which responded to a more competitive international 
environment. The policy signified a pragmatic and realist (in the common language 
usage) shift. Realist policy in this article, thus, refers to a policy that is both ‘realist’ in 
adapting to the real world and also crucially neorealist in the theoretical sense. As the 
ensuing empirical section demonstrates, although recent trade policy has become overtly 
“realist”, realist considerations underlay the EU’s trade policy since its inception, even if 
at times these have dovetailed with other foreign policy normative aims. 
The materialist and individualist meta-theory on which realism and rationalism is built, 
and the treatment of preferences and interests as exogenous and individualistic have 
been heavily criticised. Explanations emphasising ideas have emerged as rivals to the 
rationalist emphasis on preferences (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 4). Such ‘rivalry 
suggests interests are not themselves ideas but material’, yet even ‘economists have 
noted that nothing in their approach prevents taking desires (or interests or 
preferences), as being informed by or based on norms’ (Fearon and Wendt 2002: 60). 
The interaction of ideas and interests is, therefore, a dynamic tension, as the empirical 
section makes apparent. As Max Weber (1946: 280) suggested: 
‘Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men’s conduct. Yet 
very frequently the ‘world images’ that have been created by ideas have, like 
switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the 
dynamic of interest.’ 
As Robert Keohane and Judith Goldstein (1993: 20) contend, ‘ideas help to order the 
world’ and ‘have a lasting influence on politics through their incorporation into the terms 
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of political debate’, although the impact of particular ideas may be mediated by the 
institutions in which these are embedded.  
Ideas have been crucial in the development of the EU’s foreign policy and its study. 
Characterised as a ‘civilian power’ (Duchene 1972), which uses persuasion and the 
power of attraction generated by others’ admiration of it,1 throughout its history, the EU 
has leveraged its market attraction and its financial aid as a bargaining chip to extract its 
preferences from others. The EU has often linked these rewards (and penalties of 
economic sanctions) to the adoption of core European values (human rights, democracy, 
rule of law). This has led to interpretations of the EU as a “normative power” (Manners 
2002),2 to such an extent that the EU has been critiqued for subjugating its normative 
values to strategic interests such as regional stability (Youngs 2004). However, as Erik 
Eriksen (2006) argues, strategic aims can be compatible with the “normative” power 
argument, given that the norms diffused may very well be considered valid and 
legitimate even though the motives of the EU for diffusing such norms are self-
regarding. James March and Johan Olsen (1998: 952) also highlight that the ‘logic of 
consequences’ (which guides rationalist views of agency) and the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (which explains agency in ideas-based approaches) are not mutually 
exclusive.3 This interrelationship will become apparent in the narrative of DG Trade’s 
policies on PTAs. Normative components like the promotion of regional integration, 
embedded in a ‘logic of appropriateness’, also followed strategic aims of milieu-shaping 
and market creation, in line with the ‘logic of consequences’, and show how ideas can 
suggest a path for the attainment of realist interests. The ensuing narrative, therefore, 
focuses on how particular policies have been affected by ideas and values held by 
institutional policy-makers, (the ideational component), and provided the avenues for 
the pursuit of material interests. Criteria for “realist” and “ideational” trade policy are 
summarised in Table 1 and it will be shown that it is the dynamic interplay of these 
forces that helps to explain the evolution of the EU’s trade policy in recent decades. 
 
Table 1: ‘Realist’ and ‘Idealist’ Trade Policy 
Policy style Objectives Inspiration 
Realist Material: 
Market creation 
Market opening & access 
Business opportunities 
Competitiveness 
Economic power position 
 
‘Logic of consequences’ 
Profit / power maximization 
 
Idealist Promotion of values: 
Democracy 
Governance 
Development 
Regional integration 
 
‘Logic of appropriateness’ 
Self-perception of European 
identity/identity formation 
 
 
ESTABLISHING A ‘GLOBAL PRESENCE’ THROUGH PTAS 
The EU’s success as a PTA has motivated others to emulate it, affording its ‘soft power’ 
through ‘deference’ and ‘attraction’ (Nye 1990). Given its institutional bias in its 
international negotiations based on its organic experience of market integration reliant 
on legalistic and regulatory regimes (Young and Peterson 2006), the EU has also actively 
promoted regional integration. Traditionally, the EU’s bilateral trade policy lacked an 
overarching plan. It derived from past relations and the uploading of national interests 
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and special relationships into the EU external relations (Lamy 2002a). Prior to 1999, the 
Commission’s Directorates dealing with external affairs were organised geographically. 
Thus, PTA initiatives were promoted as each commissioner sponsored each PTA as a way 
of increasing ‘his patch of power’ (Peterson and Bomberg 1999: 104). Geographic 
initiatives also reflected the nature of the political objectives to be achieved by 
leveraging the EU’s market attraction. This period witnessed an upgrading of political, 
financial and technical cooperation agreements of the 1970s-1980s into agreements with 
trade liberalisation, investment, and political cooperation (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 
67). 
“Third generation” agreements included conditionality clauses furthering the EU’s 
normative values of democracy, human rights and rule of law. Trade was linked to the 
CFSP’s goals: ‘to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Title V Art. 11.1, Treaty on European Union 
1993). Normative aims were tempered by a desire to ensure security and stability 
(Youngs 2004), especially in its near abroad. Agreements were signed with the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the Mediterranean Basin. The European 
Agreements, which paved the way for Eastern enlargement, were the most 
comprehensive, and as commentators argue, the most successful in achieving the EU’s 
desired policy transformations given the enticing carrot of membership (Smith 2004). 
The Barcelona Process (1995) aimed at PTAs between North Africa and the EU, in the 
hope of extending some of the internal market aspects to the area and enhancing 
cooperation in migration flows, improving stability and furthering the security aims of the 
CFSP (Gómez 2003). The launch of PTA negotiations with the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) has been regarded as a way of ensuring access to Gulf oil and fostering stability in 
the region using the EU’s market attraction as a means of exchange (Antiewicz and 
Momani 2009; Nonneman 2007). 
Alongside realist-inspired stability/strategic motivated PTAs, the EU also engaged in 
development-motivated PTAs. Relations with former colonies in the Africa Caribbean 
Pacific (ACP) were regulated through the Lomé Conventions and were characterised by 
asymmetry allowing ACP exports preferential access to the EU’s market. These 
harnessed the EU’s institutional bias and ideational belief in trade as a vehicle for 
development (‘logic of appropriateness’, based on its experience), which has been 
criticised especially given restrictions on agricultural exports (McQueen 1998), as well as 
by other WTO members that felt discriminated. This led the EU to eliminate asymmetric 
preferences in the Cotonou Agreements of 2000. The Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) that make up the framework of the Cotonou Agreements have instead been 
critiqued for enforcing neoliberal liberalization on the developing world (Hinkle and Schiff 
2004; Stevens 2006).  
Economically-motivated PTAs were also initiated in the 1990s between the EU and Latin 
America. Commentators agree that the Global Agreement with Mexico (1997) and the 
commencement of negotiations with Mercosur and Chile (1999) were responses to the 
creation of NAFTA in 1994, and subsequent loss of market share in Mexico, and the 
launch of negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Bessa-Rodrigues, 
1999; Barrau, 1999; Briceño Ruiz, 2001). Officials at the Commission’s Directorate 
General for External Relations conceded that the sudden involvement of the USA in PTAs 
‘raised alarm bells’, and that there was an effort to engage with that part of the world, 
within the broader post-1989 agenda of establishing a ‘global presence’ (DG Relex 
interview 2007). Consequently, the Commission’s 1994 ‘Basic Document on Relations 
with Latin America and the Caribbean’ suggested upgrading relations with this region, 
and extending some form of association to the most advanced economies: 
Mercosur/Chile and Mexico (European Commission 1994b). This would guarantee EU 
access to these markets in the face of a potential FTAA. These PTAs clearly followed a 
‘realist’ logic of balancing against the USA and furthering EU commercial interests. 
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Whilst embedded within the overarching EU trade policy objectives of freeing trade, EU 
PTAs were characterised by heterogeneity and varied rationales (strategic, 
developmental and economic). Furthermore, all negotiations embodied the EU’s new 
normative goals through democratic clauses. The pursuit of certain ideals extended 
beyond the promotion of EU values of human rights, democracy and rule of law 
associated with ‘normative power Europe’ (Manners 2002), and incorporated the pursuit 
of regional integration. This was apparent in all PTA negotiations with the notable 
exception of the agreement with Mexico. Here the economic imperative of limiting the 
trade diversions caused by NAFTA (Barrau 1999) at the behest of EU domestic exporters 
(Dür 2007) hastened negotiations and resulted in this anomaly, which reiterates the 
ever-present material interests underlying EU trade policy as expressed in the Treaties. 
Relations with the CEECs also took on a bilateral approach where the EU was able to 
better exert conditionality, but resulted in successful regionalism with the expansion of 
the EU’s own regional integration eastwards (Smith 2005). Promoting regional 
integration and the development of international relations upon the basis of interregional 
relations was a crucial element of the EU’s external relations and encapsulated its hopes 
for a multipolar world. 
 
EXTENDING THE EU REGIONAL INTEGRATION MODEL THROUGH PTAS 
Interregionalism, relations between regional groupings, became a hallmark of the EU’s 
external relations in the late 1990s (Hardacre and Smith 2010). The underlying logic ‘to 
export the EU’s model of regional integration and governance and to create new alliances 
in order to shape a less asymmetric world’ (Santander 2002: 495) was based on the 
EU’s officials’ belief in the superiority of the EU’s model of economic and institutionalszed 
integration as a basis of stability and development (interviews DG Trade and DG Relex 
and COREPER 2007). Discourses in the Commission’s documents from the 1990s 
onwards betray these ideational preferences: 
‘EMPHASIZING the fundamental importance attached by the parties to 
consolidating and strengthening regional integration, a key factor in the 
development of the GCC Countries and the stability of the Gulf region’ (European 
Community 1989: 3). 
‘To support efforts by Asian countries to cooperate at the regional and 
subregional level such as the ASEAN Regional Forum with a view to enhancing 
peace and security in the region and (...) strengthen the Union's relations with 
regional groups such as ASEAN or SAARC’ (European Commission 1994b: 4). 
‘Cooperation shall provide effective assistance to achieve the objectives and 
priorities which the ACP States have set themselves in the context of regional and 
sub-regional cooperation and integration, including inter-regional and intra-ACP 
cooperation’ (Art. 29 Cotonou Convention 2000). 
‘The European Union believes that regional integration processes are vital tools 
for the attainment of global integration. Its own experience shows that when a 
region has resolved its internal problems, it is better able to integrate itself in the 
global arena, in which, the consolidation of regional blocks entails a greater 
global equilibrium. Mercosur’s integration is a process of great importance to the 
European Union’ (European Commission 2002: 2). 
‘Regional integration is a key element for stability, economic growth and 
investment and for increasing the weight of both regions on the world stage…we 
encourage and strongly support Latin American and Caribbean countries to 
proceed with their respective regional integration processes’ (Declaration of 
Vienna 2006: 11). 
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‘The region also faces the need to further its regional integration agenda, which is 
an essential tool to preventing conflict, consolidating democracy, good 
governance and fostering sustainable development (European Commission 
2007c: 13)’. (author’s italics) 
Integration is, thus, embedded within the EU’s normative aspirations as well as its 
geopolitical interests (security and stability). This dovetailed in the late 1990s with 
developments in regional integration elsewhere (Mercosur, Andean Community and 
ASEAN commitments to create customs unions). EU policy-makers, also shaped by their 
own socialisation within the EU’s system and belief in its success, chose to support these 
regional initiatives by engaging in interregional relations as the Commissioner for the 
developing world, Manuel Marín (2010), and the European Parliament President, Maria 
Gil-Robles (2010), at the time, have admitted. Both also expressed regret that the 
institutionalised EU-style integration that they thought would develop from their 1990s 
initiatives never materialised.  
The EU actively used interregional relations to encourage regional integration elsewhere. 
It facilitated the creation of infrastructure necessary for economic integration (e.g. 
Hidrovía project, Brazil-Buenos Aires and Montevideo-Buenos Aires roads financed with 
EIB loans) (European Commission 1994b: 9), and devoted half of cooperation funds to 
Mercosur to measures to improve institutions (European Commission 2007a). It funded 
activities to enhance institutional capacity by instilling information exchanges, technical 
assistance, and cooperation between the ASEAN Secretariat and European Commission 
(EU/ASEAN Vision Group 2005: 17). Such exchanges also enabled the EU (especially the 
Commission) to act as mentors to other integration processes and attempt to influence 
them to adopt EU style standards furthering the EU’s milieu-shaping preferences.4  
More coercive persuasion, by means of conditionality, has also been employed by the EU 
to further this ideational aim of creating ‘a world of regions open to one another’ (Marín 
2010). The EU has entered into EPAs with ACP regional groupings rather than states, 
although as Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2009: 16) note this worked only where 
prior regional integration projects existed. Conditionality was stronger in the cases of the 
opening of negotiations for Associations Agreements with Central America and the 
Andean Community. Despite these countries’ entreaties to the EU to negotiate with 
them, the EU refused for over half a decade in the early 2000s, and conditioned 
negotiations to the higher levels of regional integration: 
‘The Parties recognise that the prospect of Association Agreements should give a 
new impetus for strengthening regional economic integration processes (…) 
This process will start, at this stage, with a joint assessment phase of the 
respective integration processes of the Central American and Andean 
Community’s. The assessment will lead, in due course, to negotiations (…) Any 
future Free Trade Agreement shall be built upon the outcome of the Doha 
Development Agenda and the realization of a sufficient level of regional economic 
integration’ (Guadalajara Declaration 2004: 8). 
A Joint Assessment Exercise was set up for the EU to monitor regional integration 
progress, but it lacked a clear ex ante methodology and developed progressively 
following an agenda set by the European Commission (Adiwasto et al. 2006: 13), clearly 
revealing that the level of integration had to be deemed sufficient by the EU. Similarly, 
the EU rejected Singaporean requests for PTA negotiations in 2003 (interview DG Trade 
2007) and only opened negotiations with Central America, the Andean Community and 
ASEAN, all of them regional groupings, in 2007.  
The normative implications of this are to re-shape the world according to EU lines, 
including the export of its model and its regulations as well as enabling the EU to control 
the agenda of relations and ensuring other regional blocs remain open, leading some to 
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view this as a form of ‘soft imperialism’ (Hettne and Söderbaum 2005). In a 
constructivist reading of interregionalism it is a ‘vehicle to gain international acceptance 
of its (the EU’s) own model of integration’ (Söderbaum et al. 2005: 372), which results 
from the ‘need to forge a common European identity among the people of its constituent 
nations and by a belief in the utility of regions as unit for organizing the global economy’ 
(Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 14). Yet, very realist materialism is intertwined with these 
normative aims and recalls the free trade aims of trade policy in the Treaties. From the 
EU’s perspective PTAs with individual Central American states, or Singapore, would offer 
marginal increases in EU welfare. It was economically more relevant to negotiate with an 
integrated grouping which would represent a more interesting market (interview DG 
Trade 2007), whilst offering savings in time and resources in negotiations (Reiterer 
2005: 14).  
 
DEVELOPMENT, WTO DOHA ROUND AND PTAS 
In late 1999, the structure of the Commission’s external relations DGs changed to a 
thematic structure with DG Trade, DG Relex, DG Enlargement and DG Development, 
(Nugent and Saurugger 2002). Although, within the DGs, desks were still distributed 
geographically and both a division for WTO negotiations and one for PTAs continued to 
co-exist, the new structure facilitated overarching Trade initiatives (e.g. Global Europe). 
Pascal Lamy’s leadership of the new DG Trade combined in time with an internal debate 
in the Commission’s in favour of South-South integration (interview DG Trade 2007), 
and the launch of the WTO’s Doha Development Round (DDR) in 2001. Policies under his 
stewardship were influenced by this, as well as Lamy’s preferences for multilateral 
negotiations (interview DG Trade 2007; Woolcock 2007). His significance in shaping the 
ideational direction of trade policy during this period has been highlighted by Sophie 
Meunier (2007), although she acknowledges that steering the policy more in one 
direction or another is only possible in the absence of a conflict with the material 
interests of member states. Encompassing the promotion of integration, Lamy developed 
a doctrine of ‘harnessing globalization’, to guide his DG, whereby: 
‘The European blend of market integration, common rules and social safety net 
mechanisms can serve as an inspiration for many countries in coping with the 
effects of globalization. The European Union is interested in promoting politically 
managed globalization so as to ensure that its potential benefits are shared more 
widely across nations and societies and that social values are prioritized’ (Lamy 
2002b: 1). 
This ‘was a broad and encompassing doctrine that subordinated trade policy to a variety 
of trade and non-trade objectives, such as multilateralism, social justice and sustainable 
development’ and was defended at the WTO (Meunier 2007: 906). Favouring 
multilateralism and influenced by the skepticism of economists concerned with the 
undermining of the multilateral trading system by increasing numbers of PTAs (Thurow 
1992; Baldwin 1993; Bhagwati 2008; Krugman 1991), Lamy enacted a moratorium on 
new PTAs. Given policy lock-ins from past commitments creating path dependency, Lamy 
was forced to continue PTA negotiations that had already commenced with Mercosur and 
Chile (Garcia 2011), the Gulf Cooperation Council and within the Barcelona Process.  
During the late 1990s, the EU’s PTA initiatives responded to challenges of the post-Cold 
War world, a desire to create a ‘global presence’ and carve a role in a multipolar world. 
This was furthered in the early 2000s as the EU sought international leadership within 
the WTO, by supporting the DDR, and pushing its ‘managed globalization’ ideas. Trade 
and development were interlinked at the multilateral level and in the EU’s own policies. 
EPAs are described as a way of bringing the EU’s development regime in line with WTO 
compliance. In 2002, the European Commission published several communications 
explicitly linking its trade and development policies (European Commission 2002a, 
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2002b). It suggested focusing development aid to supporting adaptation to and 
accession to WTO (European Commission 2002a: 6). Imbued in the belief that those 
countries with greater participation in global markets show higher growth rates 
(European Commission 2002a: 8) and the EU’s socialised belief in the economic success 
of its liberalization model (interviews DG Trade and Relex 2007), it supports greater 
liberalization.  
Although developing states could perhaps benefit from more trade, EU measures aimed 
to improve regulatory systems, ensure compliance with TRIPS, standards and safety 
measures (European Commission 2002a: 22), in other words, exporting its preferred 
regulatory system and in essence ensuring developing producers had to face similar 
regulatory constraints as EU producers, and that EU investments would be protected by 
stable legislation (material interests). Betraying its institutional bias and its policy-
makers’ ideational ‘logic of appropriateness’, the Commission stressed the need for 
greater South-South cooperation and regional integration, as a way of gaining 
economies of scale, greater FDI and ensuring stability and security (European 
Commission 2002a: 13).This offers a justification for the continuation of interregional 
negotiations within an ideational regime in DG Trade now leaning towards the WTO. 
Further inconsistencies in the EU’s region-building logic and interregional agenda in PTAs 
appeared in the 2000s in relations with the Mediterranean. The original Barcelona 
Process promoted regional integration, although it aimed at negotiating individual PTAs 
(as opposed to bloc-to-bloc as with ASEAN and Latin American groupings). This 
pragmatic approach was due to the absence of clear regional initiatives in the region, 
and the realist security and stability motivation behind these PTAs. In 2003, with Eastern 
enlargement underway redrawing the EU’s external borders, the Commission launched 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Barcelona Process became absorbed 
into it. The EU continues to promote regional integration as a way of achieving security 
and stability: ‘[t]he EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation 
that are preconditions for political stability, economic development, and the reduction of 
poverty and social divisions in our shared environment’ (European Commission 2003: 3). 
However, the ENP does not provide for any institutionalisation of the regional dimension 
and undermines the previous emphasis on region-building by turning this area into just 
another one within the broader ENP (Börzel and Risse 2009: 21). Compared to the 
Barcelona Process, ENP downgrades the regional dimension to ‘a complementary, and in 
fact optional, element, although the ENP incorporates ‘a much stronger conditionality 
that goes hand in hand with the country-to-country approach that the policy implies, and 
which could be viewed as an indication of the EU's new sense of reality’ (Del Sarto and 
Schumacher 2005: 25). This ‘new sense of reality’ was further heightened within DG 
Trade with the abandonment of the normative aims of region-building in the second half 
of the 2000s as the DDR faltered and its leadership changed. During Lamy’s tenure, 
ideational normative constructs like ‘managed globalisation’, linkages of trade and 
development, and normative support for region-building, co-existed with the pursuit of 
‘realist’ economic interests as well as geostrategic goals of security as can be seen in the 
changes in the ENP. Thus, even in this period where the institutional rhetoric displayed 
more normative underpinnings, there was a tendency for EU material interests to trump 
more idealistic facets of the policy. 
 
COMPETITIVENESS AND INTERESTS IN THE EU’S PTA STRATEGY 
Peter Mandelson (Trade Commissioner 2004-2008), a committed free-trader, was 
unlikely to alter policy in terms of creating a global free trade system. The ‘Global 
Europe’ strategy of 2006 manifests that ‘[t]he WTO remains the most effective way of 
expanding and managing trade in a rules-based system, and a cornerstone of the 
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multilateral system. The Doha Development Agenda remains our first priority’ (DG Trade 
2006: 2). 
However, Mandelson faced a new international situation, where other actors had limited 
faith in the DDR. PTAs had been increasing, especially in Asia and Latin America 
(Fiorentino et al. 2006), prompting others to follow suit as they feared trade diversion 
effects creating a kind of ‘domino effect’ (Baldwin 1993). EU and USA perceived 
predominance in setting WTO rules, and the new PTA wave, encouraged China to 
commence negotiations with ASEAN in 2001 and others (Jiang 2010; Zeng 2010). 
Crucially, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick pursued a ‘three-dimensional trade 
strategy’ (Schott 2006: 98) abandoning prior preferences for multilateral liberalization in 
favour of simultaneous multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiations so as ‘to exert 
latent pressure on recalcitrant liberalisers by concluding PTAs’ with other states. The 
world was in the midst of a PTA negotiation bonanza, whilst the EU had voluntary 
withdrawn from new negotiations. Faced with this, Mandelson steered the EU’s PTA trade 
policy in in line with what other states were doing. 
‘Global Europe’ presents PTAs as compatible alongside commitment to the WTO, and in a 
departure from Lamy’s era, advocates new PTA negotiations, including with individual 
states. It is symptomatic of the ‘competitiveness’ ideational justification offered, and its 
linkages with the competitiveness-driven Lisbon Agenda re-launched in 2005, that DG 
Trade presents new criteria for choosing PTA partners: 
‘The key economic criteria for new FTA partners should be market potential 
(economic size and growth) and the level of protection against EU export 
interests (tariffs and non-tariff barriers). We should also take account of our 
potential partners’ negotiations with EU competitors, the likely impact of this on 
EU markets and economies…’ 
‘Based on these criteria, ASEAN, Korea and Mercosur (with whom negotiations 
are ongoing) emerge as priorities. They combine high levels of protection with 
large market potential and they are active in concluding FTAs with EU 
competitors’ (DG Trade 2006: 11). 
India, Russia and the GCC are mentioned as potential candidates too, if less urgent, as 
they were not in direct negotiations with the USA. The ‘new competitiveness-driven FTAs 
(DG Trade 2006: 11) focus on furthering the EU’s economic interests by strengthening 
links with markets that will be important in the future (Woolcock 2007: 4). In terms of 
content, they offer continuity with the ‘deep trade agenda’ that Lamy (2002) had 
favoured seeking the liberalisation of services, investment, public procurement and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights (DG Trade 2006: 11, 13). There is also a 
concern with staying on a par with competitors: ‘Where our partners have signed FTAs 
with other countries that are competitors to the EU, we should seek full parity at least’ 
(DG Trade 2006: 11), which accounts for the choice of PTA partners (Korea was 
negotiating with the USA as were Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, and ASEAN was 
negotiating with China) and is reminiscent of the EU’s celerity in negotiating a PTA with 
Mexico in the aftermath of NAFTA, even though it had not contemplated it in the 1994 
strategy for Latin America (European Commission 1994a).  
Despite the new pragmatism, ‘Global Europe’ maintained some of the previous ideational 
normative elements. Although the prior discourses of development, which Mandelson still 
applied in speeches (Mandelson 2005), were absent from the Document, it 
acknowledged the need to address the ‘losers’ from globalization and reiterated: ‘we 
should also seek to promote our values, including social and environmental standards 
and cultural diversity, around the world’ (DG Trade 2006: 5). The latter serves the dual 
purpose of enhancing EU influence and also exporting its standards thus placing its own 
producers on a par with, or even at an advantage over, those from other parts of the 
world. It is, therefore, not bereft of material interests linked to competitiveness. Further 
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continuities are present in the support for region-building through negotiations with 
blocs. Indeed ‘Global Europe’ prioritises negotiations with Mercosur, ASEAN (both 
regional groupings), but also accepts individual states (South Korea), and the 
pragmatism of bilateral negotiations became more apparent throughout the negotiation 
process. 
In May 2007, the EU and ASEAN commenced PTA negotiations, but with difficulties, 
given differences amongst ASEAN members and the EU’s requirements. Concerned with 
not losing competitiveness to the USA and China, in March 2010, on a trip to South East 
Asia, the Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht (since 2009), announced the launch of 
bilateral PTAs with Singapore and Vietnam, and, in November, negotiations with 
Malaysia commenced.5 These are the states that had already closer economic ties with 
the EU, and the ones expected to benefit most from PTAs (ECORYS 2009). These states 
were amongst the group of six ASEAN states that had already begun to implement their 
PTA; with China (in January 2010) and Singapore and Malaysia also had PTAs with the 
USA (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Timeline of EU, USA, Chinese FTAs in East Asia 
 
CHINA 
start 
CHINA 
conclude 
USA 
start 
USA 
conclude 
EU 
start 
EU 
conclude 
ASEAN 2001 2007(2010*)  2007  
Hong Kong  2003     
Macao  2003     
Thailand  2003 2004 (suspended 2006)   
Singapore  2008  
2003 
(2004) 
2010 2012 
South Korea   2006 
2007 
(2011) 
2007 
2009 
(2011) 
Malaysia (ASEAN)  
2006 (trade investment 
framework agreement 
2004) 
2010  
Vietnam (ASEAN)    2010  
ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Viet Nam. Dates in brackets represent implementation dates when these differ from the 
conclusion of the negotiations. *2010 for Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, 2015 for the others. Sources: European Commission DG Trade website, US Trade 
Representative website, ASEANWEB (2012) 
 
Notwithstanding this pragmatic approach the EU remains intent on a subsequent bloc-to-
bloc FTA with ASEAN: 
‘The launch of FTA negotiations with Singapore, for us, marks the beginning of a 
deeper engagement with Asia, and in particular in our relations with the ASEAN 
region. Although Singapore is the ‘first one in’, our door remains open for other 
ASEAN countries interested in negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement 
with us. We are not available to do shallow FTAs, but we will be mindful of 
differences in levels of development’ (De Gucht 2010a). 
Although not highlighted as key priorities in the ‘Global Europe’ document, in the early 
2000s Central American and Andean Community states had negotiated PTAs with the 
USA, and asked the EU for negotiations. The EU responded by postponing negotiations 
Volume 9, Issue 4 (2013) jcer.net María García 
 533 
until a sufficient degree of integration had been achieved. In 2007 the EU began 
negotiations with the Andean Community and Central America. As with ASEAN, a bloc-
to-bloc negotiation failed. In the case of the Andean Community, Bolivia boycotted 
negotiations and Ecuador withdrew in 2009 over intellectual property clauses. The EU’s 
decision to continue negotiations with Peru and Colombia on an individual basis contrasts 
with the negotiations with Mercosur (see Doctor, 2007). The fact that Peru and Colombia 
had already agreed PTAs with the USA, unlike Mercosur states, and the EU’s new 
competition-driven policy, account for this pragmatic turn.6 Table 3 shows the USA has 
held the initiative in recent years, in contrast to the situation in the late 1990s when the 
EU led in negotiations with the Mercosur and Chile (García 2011: 513).  
 
Table 3: USA and EU Free Trade Agreements with Latin America 
 
USA 
start 
USA 
end 
USA 
implement 
EU 
start 
EU 
end 
EU 
implement 
Mexico 1988 1992 1994 NAFTA 1996 1997  
Chile 2000 2003 06/2003 1999 2002 01/2003 
Mercosur    1999   
Brazil    Strategic Partnership 2007 
Andean 
Community 
   2007 failed  
Peru 2004 2006 2009 2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Colombia 2004 2006  2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Ecuador 2004 Stopped 2006 2007 Withdrew 2009 
Central 
America 
2003 2006 2006-2009 2007 2010 Likely in 2013 
Panama 2005 2007  
Incorporated into Central America 
negotiations in 2008 
All of Latin 
America 
FTAA 1994 
Unlikely prospects, stalled 
2005 
   
Sources: DG Trade (2012); USTR (2012) 
 
By contrast, bloc-to-bloc negotiations with Central America, achieved a degree of 
regional integration (Panama’s participation was made conditional on it joining SIECA, 
which it did). This is an area with an overwhelming dependence on the USA and keen to 
diversify, which explains formal acquiescence with EU demands. However, it is worth 
noting that even at the signing of the agreement in May 2010, Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso emphasised, the EU still expected more regional integration, when 
he stated that ‘[w]e hope this agreement between the regions will also contribute to 
strengthening Central American integration and institutional government there’ (EU-LAC 
Summit Press Conference, 19/5/2010). 
Mercosur was highlighted as a priority area in ‘Global Europe’ and is an area where the 
EU still hopes to achieve its interregional objectives, as the agreement has been finalised 
since 2004, pending a final deal on access to the EU’s agricultural market (Doctor 2007; 
Klom 2003; Schneider 2006). In the absence of Mercosur-USA negotiations it seems 
there is less impending pressure to achieve a deal. In the meantime, the EU has taken 
other steps to strengthen its position in the region, within the new paradigm of 
competitiveness. Recognising the significance of Brazil in the world economy and its 
leadership position within the G20 and South America, in 2007 the EU gave Brazil a 
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special status as a ‘strategic partner’. Within the Strategic Partnership the Commission 
(2007: 9) ‘look(s) to Brazil to make a constructive contribution towards the conclusion of 
a balanced and comprehensive EU-Mercosur agreement’, which would offer economic 
advantages to EU service and manufacture industries (IARC 2008). Beyond this desire to 
achieve an EU-Mercosur deal, the document also focuses on a host of trade issues 
(including financial services, intellectual property) in which the EU would like to pursue 
greater access and recognition of standards with Brazil, which would damage the EU-
Mercosur relation, as Brazil would gain exclusive benefits, and which betrays the EU’s 
clear economic interests in this market.  
In the midst of a serious financial and economic crisis, the ‘Trade, Growth and World 
Affairs’ strategy issued in November 2010 follows the line of ‘Global Europe’, and is 
justified with greater appeals to ‘the triple benefits of trade’ opening: ‘economic growth, 
consumer benefits and job creation’ (DG Trade 2010a: 5). It links Trade policy to the 
EU’s 2020 growth strategy aimed at creating smart, sustainable and inclusive jobs and 
growth (just as Global Europe was linked to the Lisbon Agenda). The 2010 Strategy 
continues past trends, it reiterates commitment to the Doha Round (DG Trade 2010a: 
9), prioritises competitiveness-driven FTA negotiations (DG Trade 2010a: 10), and 
focuses on ‘deep trade’ issues of international liberalisation of public procurement and 
regulatory regimes (DG Trade 2010a: 6). It retains some linkages to sustainable 
development, and the overt ‘competitiveness’ language of ‘Global Europe’: ‘We need to 
do more to leverage the effectiveness of internal and external policies and thereby 
enhance Europe’s competitiveness in the global market place’ (DG Trade 2010a: 7). 
The sense of competition with new economic giants is clear when it asserts that trade 
policy needs to pay special attention to the US, China, Japan, Russia, India and Brazil 
(DG Trade 2010a: 10). As these are the largest economies (China, India, Brazil also the 
fastest growing) and the EU’s top trade and investment partners, prioritising these 
seems perfectly rational from a strategic point of view. A purely pragmatic step, yet it 
does represent a shift from the late 1990s-early 2000s greater self-confidence and 
external projection aims (interregionalism, values) pursued by the EU. ‘Trade, Growth 
and World Affairs’ reveal an ongoing ideational belief in the benefits of liberalisation and 
globalization (despite the crisis). A preparatory paper for this Document endeavours to 
stress the benefits of trade: ‘The role of trade will be crucial in ensuring that potential 
market opportunities are translated into additional businesses and jobs’ (DG Trade 
2010b: 26). 
It also raises concerns over the imposition of trade barriers in the aftermath of the crisis, 
especially by non-WTO member Russia (DG Trade 2010a: 21), and posits part of the 
blame for imbalances at the emerging economies’ door, in statements such as ‘[t]he 
ongoing process of macroeconomic adjustment must also include a greater contribution 
to world aggregate demand from those economies (both advanced and emerging) which 
ran large current account surpluses’ (DG Trade 2010a: 24). DG Trade, thus, is putting 
forward a policy clearly aimed at pursuing what it perceives to be EU economic gain. 
However, the difficulty may now lie in persuading partners to acquiesce to EU regulatory 
preferences, at a time when some of its previous appeal may be waning, and when 
economies previously highly dependent on the EU are succeeding in diversifying their 
trade and investment relationships. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From the previous narrative it is clear that the EU’s PTA strategies have been mediated 
through time by the ideational preferences of DG Trade leadership, normative goals, and 
realist economic interests embedded in changing international developments. What is 
significant about PTAs as trade policy tools is the fact that economists broadly agree on 
their limited aggregate welfare effects (Hallaert 2008). Indeed sustainability impact 
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assessments commissioned by DG Trade typically project marginal welfare results for the 
EU (0.2-0.8 percent of GDP) (ECORYS 2008). As with other forms of liberalisation, these 
gains are asymmetrical with the EU’s service sector poised to benefit the most from 
inroads made in the EU’s deep trade agreements aimed at facilitating international 
service provision, high levels of intellectual property rights protection, and harmonising 
regulatory regimes. In so far as all PTAs in some way benefit the EU, even if the 
aggregate economic welfare effects are meager, the strategy could be said to have 
always been a realist pursuit of certain European economic interests.7 ‘Global Europe’ 
brought this to the fore, and abandoned some of the more ideational aspects of previous 
trade policy regarding global governance, EU leadership in shaping such governance, and 
reshaping the world.  
If changes in leadership provided the window of opportunity to effect that change, this 
was informed by exogenous events. As talks at the WTO faltered and the USA launched 
PTA negotiations, others followed suit, especially in Asia (Aggarwal and Urata 2006). The 
EU’s change of heart regarding PTAs in the mid-2000s can be conceptualised within this 
framework, and complements the discourse of ‘competitiveness’ expounded in ‘Global 
Europe’. The choice of negotiating partners is revealing; as they were all engaged in 
negotiations with the USA, and were in negotiations with China or expected to in the 
future (South Korea). ‘Global Europe’ presents a more unambiguously interest-seeking 
rationalist-‘realist’ policy, prioritizing economic interests in other markets and economic 
balancing against competitors.  
‘Growth, Jobs and World Affairs’ continues the ‘Global Europe’ agenda. By remaining 
committed to liberalisation the Commission reveals an internal ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
and consistency affected by its own experience, ideational beliefs beliefs, and also an 
interest-maximising ‘logic of consequences’ towards economic interests (services and 
exporters) set to benefit from liberalisation. By relinquishing more normative aspects 
associated with its trade strategy in the past, the Commission has shown a willingness to 
adapt to the realities of a dynamic and changing international economic environment. 
The challenge will be to reconcile its preferences with those of increasingly powerful 
international partners and competitors, and indeed to balance relations with the other 
major economies in the globe for mutually beneficial outcomes.  
Despite adaptability, throughout time we observe a large degree of continuity in EU 
trade policy, which is perhaps unsurprising given the pro-liberalisation objectives already 
set out in the Treaty of Rome: ‘to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international exchanges and the lowering of 
customs barriers’ (Art. 110 Treaty founding the European Economic Community 1957). 
What has varied is the relative importance of the accompanying idea-inspired normative 
aims that are pursued through trade policy, and the ideational discourses within which 
the material interests in the policy have been couched and legitimised. Commitments to 
regional integration, and a preference for PTAs with regional groups continues, as does 
formal support for the WTO and for furthering development, even if post-‘Global Europe’ 
policy is more explicitly concerned with EU competitiveness and a “realist” pursuit of 
economic interests. It is clear the ideational and realist motivations for policy choices co-
exist, with overall changes being more in format than in deep content. As shown above 
even when more normative in outlook, the EU’s PTA policy faltered in its region-building 
objectives in its neighbourhood in ENP in favour of economic and security interests, 
clearly echoing John Mearsheimer’s (2001) assertion that second-order interests will be 
trumped if they do not facilitate primary interests. In light of this, and of the increasingly 
“realist” trade policy being developed by the EU, economic realist theory offers a 
plausible explanation for, and framework for the analysis of EU trade policy and its 
positioning in the future international economic order. 
 
*** 
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1 These are traits that Nye (1990) ascribes to “soft power”. 
2 For more see Sjursen 2006; Hyde-Price 2006; 2008; Manners 2006; Diez 2004. 
3 Constructivist approaches are the newest version of idealism. Prime amongst them is Wendt’s (1999) 
challenge to rationalism by focusing on how ideas are socially constructed and affect the creation and 
choices available to agents in a system.  
4 For more see García 2012. 
5 An agreement with Singapore was signed in December 2012, and in 2013 negotiations have begun 
with Thailand and with Japan, at their request. 
6 Despite including democracy and human rights clauses, part of the EU’s normative agenda, these 
agreements have been marred by controversy with demonstrators protesting the signing on the grounds 
of Colombia’s dubious human rights record (El Mundo, 19 May 2010), again revealing the competitive 
imperative of the deal. 
7 This article has focused on EU interest as agreed in the Council. Interests vary across states, economic 
sectors, firms, societal groups, EU institutions, and time. They are dynamic, and merit separate 
attention. 
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